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that prior to the filing of the case two policy decisions must be made by the lesbian mother. The first decision is
whether or not anyone should be told of
the mother's lesbianism. On the one
hand, custody determinations are never
final, and if someone later finds that the
mother is a lesbian, it would be relatively
easy to establish a material change in circumstance justifying the revocation of
the mother's custody. On the other
hand, a mother who is straight" has a
much better chance of being awarded
custody of her children than a lesbian
mother. Thus the choice must be made
between' having an easy custody fight
and risking a later challenge on the basis
of a discovery of lesbianism, and revealing the facts at the beginning and facing a
much tougher case.
The second big decision is whether or
not the client should mention a lover. It is
quite clear that a judge is more likely to
award custody to a lesbian mother
where she is not practicing lesbianism;
however, one must consider that a healthy, well-adjusted mother will be best for
her children, and part of being healthy
and well-adjusted is having an outlet for
sexual and emotional fulfillment.
As a practical matter, the key to winning a lesbian mother custody fight is to
keep the case out of court. This is especially important when one realizes the
very broad discretion which a trial judge
has in determining the issue of custody;
the standard which is used in determining the issue is simply the best interests of
the child, however measured by the
court, and a custody determination will
not be overturned on appeal save for
grave abuse.
There are several tactical maneuvers
which should be used in attempting to
keep the fight out of court. The primary
method for accomplishing this goal is to
settle. Before attempting a settlement
however, the motives of the challenging
party, usually the father, should be
evaluated. Once these motives have
been determined, it will be easier to offer
a compromise which will satisfy them
and give the mother custody. For example, where the father's actions are
motivated by pecuniary conSiderations,
a lesbian mother may be faced with a
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deal such as limiting or eliminating child
support in exchange for the father's
promise not to challenge her custody.
Each lesbian mother will have a different
compromise level, but before rejecting
what seems to be an extremely predjudicial offer, the dangers of a judicial determination of custody should be stressed.
If the challenging party refuses to settle, the panelists advocate a course of action which they termed' 'fighting fire with
fire." This consists of collecting all ofthe
dirt one can find on the challenging
party, to be used as evidence at trial in
determining the best interests of the
child. Of course one should make clear
to the other side that such dirt is available
and perhaps then some eqUitable settlement may be arranged.
If no settlement is possible and the
case comes to trial, the primary thing to
remember is that a custody case is won
or lost at the trial level. As stated before
the only ground for reversal of a custody
determination on appeal is grave abuse
of discretion by the trial judge. Such
abuse is unlikely to be found in most custody determinations, but especially unlikely in cases involving a lesbian
mother.
At trial, the attorney for the lesbian
mother should not allow the judge to
focus on the mother's sexual preferences. It should be argued that no evidence of lesbianism should be admitted
unless it can be shown by the opposition
that there is a nexus between the
mother's sexual conduct and an adverse
effect on the well being of the children.
Unless such a connection can be shown,
evidence of lesbianism is irrelevant to the
issue of the best interests of the children.
If it is decided that evidence of lesbianism will be admissible the panelists
stressed that the mother's attorney
should be the first to make it an issue.
This tactic is considered preferable to allowing the opposition to bring it up because it avoids embarrassing questions
which the judge or opposing counsel
may pose to the mother. In bringing up
the issue of lesbianism, the speakers
suggested that an expert psychiatric witness should be produced. The witness
should have preViously interviewed the
mother and children and should be pre-

pared to testify as to the relationships between them. He should be prepared to
testify as to the causes of lesbianism, the
similarities between lesbian mothers and
"straight" mothers, and as to specific information about the particular family
unit and its acceptance of the situation.
Both speakers acknowledged the difficulties involved in this type of custody
litigation. Both admitted that in many
cases a child may be stigmatized by a
mother's open display of homosexuality. In spite of these difficulties, the
panelists thought that in many cases the
children's interests will best be served by
allowing them to remain with their
mother. In such cases there is an overwhelming need for competent attorneys
who are willing and able to give the same
quality of representation to a lesbian
mother as is given to her "straight"
counterpart.
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The
"Import-Export"
Clause
Reexamined
by Byron L. Warnken

The Supreme Court, in an 8-0 decision in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
Tax Comm'r. 96 S.Ct. 535 (1976) (Mr.
Justice White, concurring in the judgment), held that a nondiscriminatory ad
valorem property tax levied against a
wholesale inventory of imported tires
was not an "impost" or "duty" on imports, as prohibited by the "importexport" clause, art. I, § 10, cl. 2 of the
constitution. In the process, the Court
overruled Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 29 (1871), which one hundred
years earlier had held that such a"tax was
constitutionally forbidden until such time
as the imports became incorporated into
the general mass of property within the
state.
Michelin Tire Corp. (petitioner) im-
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ported tires and tubes, for which it was
assessed an ad valorem property tax on
its wholesale inventory, allegedly still in
the original package. In an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought in
state court against the county tax commissioner, Michelin was successful in its
contention that the "import-export"
clause prohibited such taxation. The
Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed in
part and reversed in part, holding that,
while the tubes in corrugated shipping
cartons were free from ad valorem taxation, the tires had been sorted, commingled with other tires, and arranged for
sale. without addressing the issue of
whether these tires had lost their import
status, the Supreme Court affirmed. In
overruling Low v. Austin, the Court held
that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax
against imported tires is not within the
constitutional prohibition against laying
duties on imports.

About one-fourth of the tires and
tubes in question were manufactured in
Nova Scotia and imported in tractor
trailers packed and sealed in Nova
Scotia. The other three-fourths were
packed and sealed in France or Nova
Scotia, from which they were imported
in sea vans (tractor-hauled trailers from
which the wheels are removed during
sea shipment). Without being packaged
or bundled, the tires were packed in bulk
in the trailers and vans. Upon arrival at
the wholesale distribution point, the tires
were sorted and stacked by size and
style, ready for sale and shipment to retailers.
Both Georgia courts found the tax
constitutionally infirm by relying on Low
v. Austin, a decision based upon the
Court's interpretation of the landmark
case of Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419 (1827). In Brown, Chief
Justice Marshall stated that " ... while [the

thing imported remains] the property of
the importer, in his warehouse, in the
original form or package in which it was
imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a
duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution." Id. at 442. Mr.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court
in Michelin, stated:
"Our independent study persuades us that a nondiscriminatory
ad valorem tax is not the type of
state exaction which the Framers of
the Constitution or the Court in
Brown had in mind as being an impost or duty and that Low v. Austin's reliance upon the Brown dictum to reach the contrary conclusion was misplaced." 96 S. Ct. at
539.
The Court reasoned that the framers
of the Constitution committed exclusive
power to the federal government to lay
imposts and duties on imports because
(1), the government should speak with
one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments, (2),
the federal government should be the
recipient of revenue from imports, and
(3), harmony among the states could be
better maintained if the advantage of
seaboard states to collect import taxes
was neutralized. The Court found that
none of the ills for which the "importexport" clause was designed to remedy
were promoted by a nondiscriminatory
ad valorem property tax imposed upon
imported goods no longer in transit.
Such right of taxation does not give seaboard states an advantage over interior
states, nor does it affect the federal government's exclusive rights as regulator of
foreign commerce and recipient of revenue thereform.
Distinguishing the tax at issue from the
prohibited "imposts" and "duties," the
Court succinctly explained not only why
such a tax was not unconstitutional, but
why it was a rational and equitable taxing device.
"Unlike imports and duties, which
are essentially taxes on the commercial privilege of bringing goods
into a country, such property taxes
are taxes by which a State apportions the cost of such services as
police and fire protection among
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the beneficiaries according to their
respective wealth; there is no reason why an importer should not
bear his share of these costs along
with his competitors handling only
domestic goods. The ImportExport Clause clearly prohibits state
taxation based on the foreign origin
of the imported goods, but it can
not be read to accord imported
goods preferential treatment that
permits escape from uniform taxes
imposed without regard to foreign
origin for services which the State
supplies." Id. at 541.
The court readily admitted that such a
tax is likely to increase the cost of the
goods at the consumer level. However, it
suggested that this is no different from
resultant increased cost of similarly taxed
domestic goods. In essence, the cost of
police and fire protection, as well as
other services provided by the state, are
passed on to the ultimate consumer in
the same manner as transportation
costs, insurance costs, etc.
Concluding its discussion of the effect
of nondiscriminatory ad valorem taxation, in light of the framers' intent regarding imports, the Court noted that
" ... since prohibition of nondiscriminatory ad valorem property
taxation would not further the objectives of the Import-Export
Clause, only the clearest constitutional mandate should lead us to
condemn such taxation. The terminology employed in the
clause - Imposts or Duties - is
sufficiently ambiguous that we decline to presume it was intended to
embrace taxation that does not
create the evils the clause was specifically intended to eliminate." Id. at
544.
The Michelin Court prefaced its overuling of Low v. Austin with an examination of Brown and an understanding of
how Low v. Austin misapplied it. In
Brown, the Court adopted the "original
package" doctrine as the test for determining when goods are imports constitutionally protected from "imposts" and
"duties. "
" ... [W]hen the importer has so
acted upon the thing imported, that

it has become incorporated and
mixed up with the mass of property
in the country, it has, perhaps, lost
its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the
taxing power of the State; but while
remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was
imported, a tax upon it is too plainly
a duty on imports to escape the
prohibition in the Constitution." 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 441-42.
In declaring unconstitutional a state
law requiring importers and their
wholesalers to obtain a $50 license as a
prerequisite to doing bUSiness, the Court
in Brown declared that:
" ... the tax intercepts the import, as
an import, on its way to become incorporated with the general mass of
property, and denies it the privilege
of becoming so incorporated until it
shall have contributed to the revenue of the State." Id. at 443
(Emphasis added).
Low v. Austin expanded the "original
package" doctrine of Brown to prohibit
any imposition, such as a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax, as
long as the goods still met the doctrine's
definition of an import.
The Low v. Austin Court failed to
heed the Brown warning that

" ... the boundary between the
power of the States to tax persons
and property within their jurisdictions and the limitations on the
power of the State to impose imposts or duties with respect to 'imports' was a subtle and difficult line
which must be drawn as the cases
arise." E96 S.Ct. at 547.
Despite the Court's noting that it
" ... might be premature to state any rule
as being universal in its application ... "
Id., Low v. Austin did just that, prohibiting any imposition upon goods still in
their original package.
The Court in Low v. Austin also missed the language of the License Cases,
46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), which directly answered the issue of Low v. Austin, as well as Michelin.
Undoubtedly a State may impose a tax upon its citizens in proportion to the amount they are respectively worth; and the importing
merchant is liable to this assessment
like any other citizen, and is chargeable according to the amount of his
property, whether it consists of
money engaged in trade, or of imported goods which he proposes to
sell, or any other property of which
he is the owner. But a tax of this
description stands upon a very
different footing from a tax on the
thing imported, while it remains a
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part of foreign commerce, and is
not introduced into the general
mass of property in the State. 46
U.S. (5 How.) at 576.
Although it can be argued that the
Court in Michelin did nothing more than
follow an 1847 precedent, the significance is in its overruling of Low v. Austin, an action which is demonstrative of
the modern trend requiring commerce
to "pay its own way." of., Colonial
Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100
(1975). Since all taxes place some burden upon commerce, the courts are beginning to look less to the burden and
more to the benefits that inure as a result
of the tax, such as fire protection, police
protection, etc. It appears that the tax will
be upheld as long as it is not discriminatory and provided that the benefits received as a result of the tax outweigh the
burdens it places upon commerce.
When commerce pays its own way
through nondiscriminatory taxation,
commerce, although theoretically burdened, is actually promoted, as a result
of the benefits that tax dollars provide.
The Michelin Court addressed the
issue of whether a nondiscriminatory ad
valorem property tax was an "impost"
pr' 'duty," yet failed to take advantage of
the opportunity to refine the "original
package" doctrine. In devising the doctrine, the Court in Brown realized that
the line between import and non-import
status may indeed be a fine one and recommended that the line be drawn as
each demands. This was appropriate,
since an 1827 court could not possibly
have foreseen the complexities of defining that line in a world of commerce
where tires have no package other than
the huge container in which they are
shipped, and that the container adds and
deletes wheels and tractor cabs as necessary to enable it, without a transfer of
goods, to surround the goods, perhaps
as their' 'original package," almost from
the point of manufacture to the point of
sale. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice White, without explaining his reasons, did find that the goods in this case
had lost their import status, subjecting
them to ad valorem taxation. Thus he
found the same result without the need
to overrule Low v. Austin.

The practical effect of this case may
well be that as long as the state imposes
the now approved nondiscriminatory
tax, without regard to import or nonimport status, against goods no longer in
transit, a determination of the exact
moment when the goods lose their import status is of little importance, since
the tax will be upheld regardless, based
upon the authority of Michelin.
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University of
Baltimore Hosts
Regional Client
Counseling
Competition
by Byron L. Warnken

The University of Baltimore School of
Law served as host school for the regional client counseling competition on
Saturday, March 6, 1976. The nine
schools from Region Two participating
were American University Law School,
Catholic University Law School, Delaware College of Law, Dickinson University Law School, Duquesne University
Law School, Georgetown University
Law School, University of Baltimore
Law School, University of Maryland

Law School, and Villanova University
Law School. The winner of the competition was the University of Maryland,
which now advances, along with eight
other regional winners, to the national
client counseling championship competition, scheduled for Saturday, March
27, at Notre Dame University, in South
Bend, Indiana.
The Region Two competition was
coordinated by Assistant Dean William I.
Weston, with the help of ten students
from the Student Bar Associations. The
nine participating teams drew lots and
competed in three groups of three, with
the three morning winners advancing to
the afternoon. The morning winners
were Georgetown (Group A), Duquesne
(Group B), and Maryland (Group C),
with Maryland winning the afternoon
session. The three morning rounds and
the round in the afternoon were each
judged by a separate panel, with each
panel consisting of three active practitioners from the Bar Association of Baltimore City. Following the morning session, a buffet luncheon was served in
Langsdale Library to all participants,
coaches, representatives from the competing schools, and judges.
The problem for this year's regional
competition involved contract litigation
and its alternatives, coupled with professional responsibility. The two-person
teams received a terse two paragraph
memorandum from the "secretary," reflecting information received from a
phone call, during which the secretary
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